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Abstract 
Allocations of child custody post-divorce are currently determined according to the Best 
Interest Standard, i.e. what is best for the child. Decisions about what is best for a child 
necessarily reflect cultural norms, at least in part. It is therefore useful as well as interesting to 
ask whether current understandings of the best interest standard align with moral intuitions of 
lay citizens asked to take the role of judge in hypothetical cases. Do factors such as whether one 
parent had an extramarital affair influence how respondents would award custody? In the current 
studies, a representative sample of citizens awaiting jury service was first given a neutral 
scenario portraying an “average” family. Almost 80% favored dividing custodial time equally 
between the two parents, replicating earlier findings. Then, in Study 1, they were given a 
second, Test case, vignette in which either the mother or the father was said to have carried on 
an extramarital affair that “essentially ruined the marriage”. In Study 2, either the mother or the 
father was said to have sought the divorce, opposed by the other, simply because he or she 
“grew tired” of the marriage.  For both Test cases, our respondents awarded the offending parent 
significantly less parenting time; about half of our respondents in each Study. The findings 
indicate that many citizens feel both having an affair and growing tired of the marriage is 
sufficient cause to award decreased parenting time, reasons for which are explored in the 
discussion.  
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Moral Intuitions about Fault, Parenting, and Child Custody after Divorce 
Between 40 and 50 percent of marriages end in divorce (Cherlin, 2010). These divorces 
obviously affect children, although such effects vary in their magnitude, nature, and causal 
pathways (Amato, 2005; Bhrolchain, et al, 2000; Bhrolchain, 2001;  Braver & Lamb, 2012, 
2012; Hetherington & Kelly, 2002; Lamb, 2012; Potter, 2010). Parental conflict, troubled 
parent-child relationships, and wholesale changes to their lives are risk factors for social, 
psychological, and educational difficulties in children, and are all associated with family 
breakdown (although whether divorce per se is the causative agent is more debatable, since 
these stressors often precede divorce; Chase-Lansdale, Cherlin, & Kiernan, 1995; Cherlin, 
Furstenberg, Chase-Lansdale, Kiernan, Robins, Morrison, & Teitler, 1991). Recent decades 
have seen renewed interest in strategies to reduce the risks associated with family breakdown. 
One possible lever is ensuring custodial arrangements that increase the prospects of the child 
retaining a healthy and supportive relationship with both parents (Amato, 2005; Emery, 1999).   
Family law, including custody law, is inevitably affected by prevailing cultural values, 
possibly even more so than for many other areas of law. This influence can be demonstrated by 
examining the historical contexts during which shifts in the law occurred. Prior to around the 
second half of the nineteenth century, English family law was primarily concerned with the 
preservation of family estates, passed down through generations via the primogeniture rule 
favoring the eldest son (Glendon, 1981). During this time married women also had very little 
independent voice of any kind. They could not vote, own property, earn wages, or sue in their 
own right. Coinciding with the societal interest in preserving family estates and a lack of 
women’s rights, paternal rights ruled in custody disputes (Grossberg, 1985; Hartog, 2000). This 
legal tradition carried over to the American colonies and was the prevailing standard during the 
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founding of the United States. Consequently, at America’s founding child custody was 
commonly awarded to fathers. 
But by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, American culture started to shift away 
from regarding a child as the property of the father. Instead it moved toward believing that 
custody should be awarded based on the child’s interests. At that time people began to believe 
that most children, especially if they were young, were better off in the care of their mothers. 
This shift can be attributed in part to a shift in the recognition of women’s property rights and to 
changes in family structure resulting from the industrial revolution (Grossberg, 1985; Hartog, 
2000). American judges, exercising discretion in the absence of any statutory rules governing the 
matter, began to award custody to mothers (Grossberg, 1985; Hartog, 2000).  Following this 
trend, most state legislatures began recognizing the importance of the child’s interests and 
eventually adopted a maternal preference, at least for young children.  
Again, in the 1960’s cultural norms shifted, influencing the divorce reform movement 
which took place in the late 1960's that eventually led to no-fault divorce and abandonment of 
the maternal preference (Kay, 2002). During this time in American history, there was increasing 
concerns with gender equality. Recognizing this cultural shift, abandonment of the maternal 
preference was recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the influential 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, adopted in 1970, which instead provided for a gender-
neutral BIS (UMDA; 1970).  The influence of gender equality was also evident in the United 
States Supreme Court’s decisions. In 1979 the Supreme Court held that state laws allowing 
wives, but not husbands, to claim alimony on divorce violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Orr. v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,1979). Concerns arose that the maternal 
preference in custody was constitutionally suspect as well. Ultimately, the gender equality 
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movement led to a gender-neutral custody standard (Kay, 2002). Although brief, this historical 
analysis highlights the ways cultural norms and values have influenced shifts in custody law (for 
a more thorough analysis see Grossberg, 1985; Hartog, 2000). 
Cultural norms and values were also responsible for causing a nationwide shift toward 
no-fault divorce. Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, divorce in most states required one 
spouse to prove the other “at fault.”  All states recognized adultery as grounds for divorce; less 
restrictive states recognized additional grounds such as “mental cruelty.” Couples who wished to 
divorce often fabricated the necessary grounds in sham proceedings, with the implicit 
cooperation of their lawyers and, often the courts, either because there was no factual basis for 
the only grounds their state recognized, or because they did not wish to put such facts in the 
public record (Ellman et al., 2010). By 1985, as divorce became more socially acceptable, all 
states eliminated this need for sham proceedings by allowing divorce by mutual consent. Indeed, 
most also allowed unilateral divorce: either spouse can end the marriage without showing the 
other is at fault (but in some states, only after a waiting period of several years) (Ellman et al., 
2010).  
Many reformers who wished to eliminate fault as a requirement for divorce also wished 
to eliminate it as a basis for child custody decisions. “The pressing need to eliminate any judicial 
consideration [with regard to custody] of marital misconduct of a parent that did not affect a 
child, which was most commonly used to disqualify mothers as custodians” (Kay, 2002, p. 31-
32) was an explicit desiderata of many reformers. The BIS was widely considered a custody 
standard much preferable to a gender-based or fault- and misconduct-based standard because it 
emphasized what is good for the child, rather than what is fair for the parents or the parents’ 
rights (Warshak, 2007). For this reason, the BIS was viewed as a crucial step forward for custody 
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  6 
 
standards.  As Kelly (1994) stated, “For the first time in history, custody decisions were to be 
based on a consideration of the needs and interests of the child rather than on the gender or rights 
of the parent” (p. 122). The BIS is also praised for its advantages of being simple, egalitarian, 
flexible, and adaptable (Chambers, 1984; Warshak, 2011).  Flexibility is beneficial because it 
allows individualized decisions for each family based on their specific circumstances and needs 
rather than trying to pigeonhole families into the same, possibly inadequate formula (Warshak, 
2011).  Likewise, the adaptability of the BIS allows it to “accommodate new knowledge and 
understanding about children’s needs and to respond to changing legal and social trends” 
(Warshak, 2011, p. 100). 
Although many recognize the benefits of the BIS over previous doctrine, there are two 
important criticisms. First, the standard’s flexibility makes it more difficult to predict the custody 
decisions of courts applying it and may also invite subjective evaluations grounded in part on the 
judge’s values—which of course may vary among judges. The unpredictability may in turn 
distort the bargaining process necessary to settle custody contests and avoid their litigation 
(Mnookin & Kornhauser, 1979). Second, the discretion given to the courts under the BIS results 
in a lack of guidance or objective basis for choosing between two fit parents. Without providing 
such guidance or weighing specific factors, there is the possibility that judges allow their own 
values and morals to influence the custody decisions whether or not they are aware that it is 
happening.   
As an example of how laws base their statutes on the BIS, the Arizona version of the BIS 
(from Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 25, Section 403) reads:
1
 
                                                          
1
This is the version of the law that was in effect when the study was run. Since then, the laws changed (in 2013).  
The new version of the Arizona Revised Statutes, is available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp?Title=25. 
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A. The court shall determine custody, either originally or on petition for modification, in 
accordance with the best interests of the child [emphasis added]. The court shall 
consider all relevant factors, including . . .  
 
B.   In a contested custody case, the court shall make specific findings on the record 
about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests 
of the child [emphasis added]. 
 
While most believe the retreat from fault was a salutary development, not all 
commentators do. The majority of those who critique no-fault do so in the belief that repealing it 
will reduce divorce rates and increase the sanctity of marriage (Schneider, 1994;Wardle, 1991), a 
claim that has been highly contested (Wolfers, 2006). But some believe fault should also be 
taken into account in allocating property (Braver & Ellman, 2013; Parkman, 2000) and in 
alimony (O'Connell, 1998; Brinig & Buckley, 1998, but see Ellman & Lohr, 1997; Ellman, 
1996). Finally, some argue that fault should be weighed in child custody (Bradford, 1996). 
Although that is not the position now taken by most states (Ellman et al., 2010), most scholars 
(Ellman et al., 2010), or the American Law Institute (2002). But little is known about how the 
public views any of these proposals. It is plausible that people would view marital fault as 
relevant to child custody arrangements since it has been well document that selection pressures 
have evolved a tendency for humans to search for, identify, and punish "wrong-doers" (Wilson, 
2012; Haidt, 2013; Cushman & Greene, 2012, Fehr & Gochter, 2002; Buckholtz et al., 2008). 
The history elucidated above shows that custody law has evolved in concert with 
changing societal values and cultural norms. Thus, it is important for lawmakers to really 
understand social consensus and lay moral intuitions. We do not argue that laymen's moral 
intuitions are the only relevant consideration decision-makers should take into account, of 
course, but contend they are relevant. That it is important to assess the moral intuition of the 
populace as a backdrop for legal policy is hardly an unprecedented proposition. There have been 
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numerous studies that examine people’s moral sentiments in the context of torts, contracts, and 
criminal prosecutions (e.g., Korobkin, 2002; Roberts & Stalans, 1997; Robinson & Darley, 1995; 
Thomas & Hogue, 1976; Tyler & Boeckmann,1997; Wissler et al., 1997). Likewise, lay 
intuitions may also be informative in the context of child custody in family law and thus provide 
policymakers with useful information about societal values.  
The Current Studies 
 In our previous study assessing lay moral intuitions (Braver, Ellman, Votruba, & 
Fabricius, 2011), we found that in a “baseline” case that presented no obvious basis for believing 
a child will be better off if primary residential custody is given to one parent as opposed to the 
other, the preponderance of respondents in our sample of citizens said that if they were the judge, 
they would divide the custodial time equally between the parents. We then tested the strength of 
that “baseline” preference for equal custody in several test cases that presented facts that, under 
some proposals or by some courts or some custody evaluators, would lead to the conclusion that 
the child’s interests required a different arrangement. In one study, respondents were told that 
either the mother or the father (depending on condition) had performed 75% of the child 
caretaking provided by the parents when they were together, a factor that would register strongly 
in that parent’s favor under the Approximation Rule proposal (Scott, 1992; ALI, 2002). In fact, 
we found these factual changes only marginally affected our respondents’ judgments of the best 
custodial arrangement and that a large majority nonetheless continued to prefer equal time 
allocations in both cases.  
In a second study, participants were told that there was considerable conflict between the 
parents, for which the two parents were equally responsible. Many custody evaluators and judges 
would be hesitant to recommend equal custody in such cases, in which there was considerable 
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parental conflict, no matter who was responsible. For example, Stahl (1999) in his guide for 
professional custody evaluators opines “high conflict parents cannot share parenting” (p. 99). 
Similarly, Buchanan (2001) writes “when parents remain in high conflict, joint custody is . . . ill-
advised” (p. 234). But again, our lay citizen respondents showed virtually no shift from equal 
custody in this case. 
In contrast, we found a large shift away from an equal time allocation in a third test case 
which also involved a lot of conflict between the parents, but in which the respondents were told 
that only the mother or only the father (depending on condition) was the primary instigator. In 
these scenarios, our participants awarded the parent causing the conflict far less parenting time 
than the other parent. One plausible reason for the above finding could be that the respondents 
believed that the parent who caused that conflict was somehow not as good a parent. But another 
possible interpretation is that they believed the conflict-causing parent should be punished for his 
or her bad behavior with a less favorable result in their custody dispute.  
If the latter possibility is correct, it suggests that respondents are using something akin to 
fault-based reasoning in deciding custody. If respondents wish to punish parents in their custody 
ambitions because they disapprove of instigating conflict, perhaps they would also be moved to 
similarly punish them for engaging in traditional fault actions, such as adultery. 
In the current studies, we attempt to replicate our baseline findings with a new sample 
and to probe further the above issue by asking respondents to decide cases with two new fact 
patterns meant to shed more light on whether they consider marital misconduct without regard to 
its possible impact on the children. In one of the studies, either the mother or the father was said 
to have committed adultery during the marriage, but the affair was kept secret from the children 
and in no way affected them. The respondents were also told that both parents “deeply love the 
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two kids and are both reasonably good parents who are involved in their children’s lives about 
like average families.”  Also in both cases, the respondents were told to decide the case on the 
basis of the child’s best interest. 
How would the courts deal with such a case under current law? In applying the BIS, 
courts generally exclude consideration of marital misconduct unless it is part of a larger set of 
facts that constitute evidence of parental deficiencies in the offending spouse. Adultery alone, 
without more, is insufficient to disfavor a spouse in a custody dispute.  But perhaps this legal 
rule is inconsistent with the public’s views. The public might believe that adultery is immoral 
and that an immoral parent should not receive primary or equal custody, whether to punish that 
parent, or to protect the child from such immoral influences. If our respondents believed that, 
they would award less time to a parent who had an affair than they would in a neutral scenario 
that was otherwise identical.  
This study sought to find out if that was the public’s view by asking them to resolve both 
a neutral case and an otherwise identical case involving adultery. To better understand the 
motivations of respondents who decide the adultery vignette differently than the neutral case, we 
also conducted a second study in which an otherwise blameless parent obtained a unilateral 
divorce just because he or she “grew tired” of the marriage. Respondents who wished to punish a 
parent for adultery, or protect the child from the immoral influences of an adulterous parent, 
should treat this third vignette differently than do respondents deciding the vignette involving 
adultery.  
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Methods: General 
Respondent Pool and Survey Distribution 
 The respondents were from the Pima County (Arizona) jury panel. Those summoned to 
serve on a jury panel are citizens chosen from the voter and driver’s license records. Using a 
computer generated random selection process, the jury panel is chosen to be a representative 
cross-section of the adult citizens in the county. Of those who are summoned by the county jury 
commissioner, over 90% eventually appear (Braver, 2007). 
 When an individual is summoned to participate on a jury panel in our County, they arrive 
in one of three shifts, at 7:30 a.m., 9:00 a.m., or 11:00 a.m. They then wait until a bailiff escorts 
a number of randomly chosen individuals from the jury assembly room to the judge’s court 
room. This continues throughout the morning. It is not uncommon for an individual to wait to be 
called for more than an hour. Additionally they may be called but then not chosen for that 
specific jury. In this case, they return and wait to be called again. It is during these waiting 
periods that the survey was administered. Participation in the survey was voluntary.  
 After each shift arrived, checked-in, and listened to instructions from the jury 
commissioner staff, they then listened to a Research Assistant who said the following: 
We are from the University. We'd very much appreciate your participation 
in a survey asking your opinions about child custody. Participation is not required as part 
of jury duty. But you're sitting here anyway, and you can help us, as well as state 
officials, by answering these questions. Please read the Instructions on the form carefully. 
Don't put your name or Juror number or any other identification on the form, which will 
remain anonymous and confidential. Raise your hand when you complete the survey, and 
one of us will pick it up. If you are called for jury service before you are finished, turn 
the survey in unfinished--we'll pick it up as you go out the door. 
 
Three Research Assistants then handed out the surveys. Different versions of the survey 
were distributed at random such that different jurors randomly received different surveys. For 
the current study, of the 422 jurors present who were approached and offered the survey, 120 
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  12 
 
chose not to take a survey form and the remaining 302 surveys were accepted. Of these 302, 227 
were completed, 69 were not completed because the respondent was called for jury service, 2 
were not completed because the respondent left for lunch, 2 were abandoned by the respondent, 
and for 2 more the respondent ultimately refused to complete it. (Of the 227 completed surveys, 
52 were for the separate previously published study described above [Braver, Ellman, Votruba 
& Fabricius, 2011], leaving a total of 175 for the 2 studies herein described). Thus the 
participation rate (excluding those prevented from completing by being called to jury or lunch) 
was 227/(422-69-2)=65%, almost identical to the rate found by Ellman, Braver, and MacCoun 
(2008). For this reason, and the representative nature of the jury panel, our past studies using 
this identical method and jury pool have found that the sample responding to the survey closely 
matches the national population in age distribution, level of education achieved, and household 
income.  
The Survey Instrument 
 The survey for both Study 1 and Study 2 had two sections, the first of which comprised 
the custody scenarios. It began with the following “stage setting” instruction: 
When a married couple with children gets a divorce, a decision needs to be made about 
where the children will live. If the two parents can’t agree about this, the courts or judges 
will make this decision.  
 
We want you to put yourself into the role of the judge in the following stories in which the 
two parents are in the process of getting a divorce and they don’t agree about what the 
living arrangements should be for their two school aged children. Please read the 
following stories very carefully and try to imagine yourself sitting on the bench in a 
courtroom needing to decide about what should be done about the couple’s disagreement 
and trying to decide as wisely as possible. You should also assume that there is nothing in 
the law itself that gives strong guidance; every case needs to be decided on its own merits 
based on what is best for the child. There is no right or wrong answer; just tell us what 
you think is right. 
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The scenario section for both Study 1 and Study 2 then described two hypothetical families 
in the process of divorce. The first, Family A, was the NEUTRAL family, described as follows: 
In Family A, the evidence presented to you shows that in many respects, this appears to be 
a pretty average, normal family. For example, there are no indications about emotional or 
mental problems, drug or alcohol problems, domestic violence or physical or sexual abuse 
on the part of either parent. There is nothing suggesting that either one lacks “fitness” as a 
parent. Most of the marriage was without unusual conflict and the family life was quite 
average. The two children both appear to be normally adjusted, doing neither particularly 
well nor particularly poorly in school and otherwise. Additional evidence shows that both 
parents deeply love the two kids and are both reasonably good parents who are involved in 
their children’s lives about like average families in which both parents work full-time (both 
M-F, 9-to-5). 
 
The marriage became lost when both parents began to feel that the other was not living up 
to expectations as a husband or wife.  They decided to seek marriage counseling, but it did 
not help or change either person’s mind about giving up on the marriage. So the divorce is 
proceeding. 
 
Since the separation, there has been relatively little conflict between the mother and the 
father. Both try especially hard never to argue in front of the children. Evidence shows that 
neither says bad things about the other to the children. Also neither tries to gain the loyalty 
of the children for themselves nor to undermine the other’s authority or relationship with 
the children. They are both trying to make the best of the current situation. 
 
Each genuinely feels the children would be better off mostly in their care and not so much 
in the care of the other parent. They really disagree about this, and as a result are asking 
you, the judge, to decide for them, understanding that each parent now wants as much 
living time with the children as you see fit to grant. Each one would be able and willing to 
make whatever adjustments to their work and living situation is necessary to accommodate 
whatever level of living time with the children you, as judge, see fit to order. 
 
After reading the above scenario, the respondent was prompted to answer two questions: 
1) What would YOU decide if you were judge? 
 
2) What do you think WILL happen if the description above was a real family in today’s 
courts and legal environment? 
 
For both questions, the possible responses were: 
 
_______Live with mother, see father minimally or not at all 
_______Live with mother, see father some 
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  14 
 
_______Live with mother, see father a moderate amount 
_______Live with mother, see father a lot 
_______Live equal amounts of time with each parent 
_______Live with father, see mother a lot 
_______Live with father, see mother a moderate amount 
_______Live with father, see mother some 
_______Live with father, see mother minimally or not at all 
As shown, the responses to the questions are based upon a nine point scale ranging from 
1=the children “live with mother, see father minimally or not at all” through 5=“live equal 
amounts of time with each parent” to 9=“live with father, see mother minimally or not at all.” 
This scale allowed us to determine the amount of time the respondent thinks the children should 
spend with each parent given the information presented in the scenario. The alternatives were the 
ones used in previous studies of living arrangements (Fabricius & Hall, 2000), which—
incidentally—allows direct comparison with the arrangements students from divorced families 
say they actually had, as well as would have wished. 
A second family, Family B, was then described, and responded to with the same two 
questions as above; we termed Family B the Test case. The nature of the Test case differed by 
Study and condition within Study, and will be described and analyzed subsequently.  
 The final section of the survey was the demographic section. In this section, the 
respondent was asked to answer a number of demographic questions including their gender. 
This section always appeared at the end of the survey. 
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Results: General 
Neutral Scenario  
 For all the surveys, the respondents were asked to assess the custody arrangement for the 
Neutral scenario in which the family was fairly average with no notable issues. For this analysis, 
the Neutrals for Study 1 and 2 were examined together, since all respondents were treated 
identically up through this point. Further, attesting to the successful randomization, the effect of 
which Test case scenario the respondents received subsequently was small and non-significant, 
F(3, 141)= .62, p=.61. The resulting frequency distributions for both the If I Were Judge item 
(M= 4.76) and the What Will Happen item (M= 3.67) (we term this factor “Perspective”) are 
shown in Figure 1. These two means are very significantly different, F(1,141)= 105.17, p< .01. 
There was no indication of interaction of Perspective X Test Case Scenario, F (3,141) =.28, p= 
.84.
2
  
As is evident by the distribution shown in Figure 1, most respondents (76.7%) answered 
“live equal amounts of time with each parent” for If I Were Judge. When answering the What 
WILL Happen item, in contrast, the respondents varied more, from “live with mother, see father 
minimally or not at all” (2.1%) to “live equal amounts of time with each parent” (29%), but on 
average answered “live with Mother, see Father a moderate amount.”3  
 
 
                                                          
2
In analyzing only the What WILL Happen judgments, there was similarly no effect of Test case version, F(3, 
141)=.38, p=.77. 
3
We also examined the impact of respondent’s gender on these judgments in a 2 X 2 (Gender X Perspective) 
analysis. There was no Gender main effect, F(1,127)=.93, p=.34, but there was a significant Gender X Perspective 
interaction, F(1, 127)=4.81, p=.03. Subsequent analysis revealed that the genders did not differ on what they would 
decide, F(1, 127)= 2.10, p=.15; the significant interaction was largely due to the fact that male respondents felt 
fathers would actually get significantly less parenting time in today’s environment (M=3.40) than female 
respondents thought (M=3.74). 
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Study 1: Extramarital Affair 
 Methods 
Study 1 varied the description of the Test case (Family B), describing one of the two 
parents as having an extramarital affair that “ruined the marriage.” The description of Family B 
took four paragraphs, three of which (the first, third, and fourth) described Family B as “like” or 
“the same as” Family A, and were identical for all conditions of both Study 1 and 2. These 
paragraphs read: 
Family B is the same as Family A in most respects. That is, this family, too, appears to be a 
pretty average, normal family. There are no indications about emotional or mental problems, 
drug or alcohol problems, domestic violence or physical or sexual abuse on the part of either 
parent. There is nothing suggesting that either one lacks “fitness” as a parent. Again, most of 
this marriage was without unusual conflict and the family life was quite average. In this family, 
too, the two children both appear to be normally adjusted, doing neither particularly well nor 
particularly poorly in school and otherwise. Additional evidence shows that both of these 
parents, too, deeply love the two kids and are both reasonably good parents who are involved 
in their children’s lives about like average families in which both parents work full-time (both 
M-F, 9-to-5). 
… 
Like in Family A, since the separation, there has been relatively little conflict between the 
mother and the father. Both of these parents, too, try especially hard never to argue in front 
of the children. Evidence shows that neither says bad things about the other to the children. 
Also, as in Family A, neither tries to gain the loyalty of the children for themselves nor to 
undermine the other’s authority or relationship with the children. They are both trying to 
make the best of the current situation. 
 
Like in Family A, each parent genuinely feels the children would be better off mostly in 
their care and not so much in the care of the other parent. They disagree strongly about this, 
and as a result are asking you, the judge, to decide for them, understanding that each parent 
now wants as much living time with the children as you see fit to grant. Each one would be 
able and willing to make whatever adjustments to their work and living situation is 
necessary to accommodate whatever level of living time with the children you, as judge, 
see fit to order. 
 
The second paragraph (inserted where the ellipses are above) described the demise of the 
marriage, the respect in which the second family differed from Family A (whose marriage, 
recall, ended “when both parents began to feel that the other was not living up to expectations as 
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a husband or wife.  They decided to seek marriage counseling, but it did not help or change 
either person’s mind…”). For Study 1, the marriage was said to have ended when one of the 
parents discovered the other’s year-long extramarital affair. The exact language was as follows.  
(Presented is the version where mother had the affair; the bracketed word was substituted for the 
preceding word in the version in which father had the affair.) 
What is different about this family is that in this family, the mother [father] became 
involved in a year long affair, which the father [mother] eventually learned of. This affair 
essentially ruined the marriage and it became apparent to both parents that the marriage was 
lost and needed to end. The affair was kept secret from the children and evidence shows it 
in no way conflicted with the mother’s [father’s] (or father’s [mother’s]) ability to parent or 
the time either spent with the children.  
 
Results 
 The Extramarital Affair study was initially analyzed as a three factor mixed analysis of 
variance with the factors of Whose Affair, a 2-level between subjects factor, and both CaseType 
(Neutral vs Test case) and Perspective (‘If I Were Judge’ vs. ‘What Will Happen’) as 2-level 
repeated measures factors. The triple interaction was not significant, F(1,65)= .02, p= .88. Of the 
three potential two-factor interactions, only the CaseType X Whose Affair was significant, 
F(1,65)= 17.53, p< .01. To explicate this effect further, since there was also a very strong and 
significant effect of Perspective, F(1, 65) = 55.66, p < .01, a “simple simple main effect” 
analysis comparing adjacent cells (Keppel, 1973) was performed as shown in Table 1 (arrows 
indicate a significant difference) for the If I Were Judge responses
4
: a: F(1,65)= .62, p= .44; b: 
F(1,65)= 12.17, p=.001; c: F(1,65)= 15.76, p<.001; d: F(1,65)= 6.63, p=.01. 
 As Table 1 shows, the respondents, if they were judge, would award custody differently 
in the Test case than in the Neutral Case, awarding significantly less parenting time to the 
                                                          
4
Analogous analyses were conducted for What Will Happen. The results were often significant (and even interacted 
with respondent’s Gender), but complex, and do not bear on the issues in this paper. In order to avoid distracting the 
reader, they are omitted. 
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spouse having the affair and correspondingly more to the innocent spouse. For Mother Affair, 
the respondents on average awarded .65 units more parenting time to Dad in the Test Case than 
in the Neutral Case. For Father Affair, the respondents awarded .49 units more parenting time to 
Mom in the Test Case than in the Neutral. Further testing showed that the .65 units Mom was 
penalized for her affair was not significantly different than the .49 units Dad was punished for 
his, F(1, 65) = .38, p=.54. Put another way, almost identical proportions (close to ½) awarded 
less parenting time to whichever parent had the affair than they awarded to that parent in the 
Neutral case. 
The distribution of choices for the Test cases is presented in Figure 2, which can be 
contrasted to those for the Neutral case of Figure 1. 
Study 2: Who Grew Tired of the Marriage 
Methods 
 The method was largely the same for Study 2. The only exception was the second 
paragraph, describing the demise of the marriage. Here, there was no extramarital affair; the end 
of the marriage was instead said to be due to one parent’s simply growing tired of the marriage 
(rather than being a mutual decision, as in the Neutral scenario.) Below is the exact wording for 
this paragraph (presented is the version where mother grew tired of the marriage; the bracketed 
word was substituted for the preceding word for the version in which father grew tired of the 
marriage). 
 What is different about this family is how the marriage became lost. Rather than both 
parents deciding together to end the marriage, as in Family A, in Family B, the mother [father] 
simply grew tired of the marriage and told the father [mother] she [he] wanted a divorce. 
Since he [she] didn’t want a divorce, he [she] suggested they seek marriage counseling, but it did 
not help or change the mother’s [father’s] mind about giving up on the marriage. So the divorce 
is proceeding.  
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Results 
Similar to the previous study, the Who Grew Tired of the Marriage scenarios were 
initially analyzed as a three factor mixed analysis of variance with the factors of Who Grew 
Tired, a two level between subjects factor, and with CaseType and Perspective both as two level 
repeated measures factors. The triple interaction was again not significant, F(1,69)= .49, p= .49. 
Of the potential two-factor interactions, only CaseType X Who Grew Tired was significant, F(1, 
69)= 37.25, p< .01. This, along with the significant main effect of Who Grew Tired, F(1,69)= 
13.62, p< .01, led to further analysis in the form of “simple simple main effect.” Table 2 shows 
this analysis (arrows indicate a significant difference for If I Were Judge,
5
 a: F(1,69)= .02, p= 
.89, b: F(1,69)= 14.22, p<.01, c: F(1,69)= 22.26, p< .01, d: F(1,69)= 11.55, p< .01).  
 As Table 2 shows, the respondents awarded less parenting time to the spouse who grew 
tired of marriage and correspondingly more to the spouse who wanted to remain in the marriage. 
In Mother Grew Tired, the Test Case judgments gave on average .50 units more time to Dad 
than in the Neutral Case; and in Father Grew Tired, the Test Case judgments gave .45 units 
more time to Mom than the Neutral Case. Further testing showed that the .50 units Mom was 
penalized for losing interest in the marriage was not significantly different than the .45 units 
Dad was punished for doing the same, F(1, 69) = .05, p=.82. While half of respondents awarded 
less parenting time to a father losing interest than they did in the neutral case, only a third did so 
when it was the mother who lost interest. This difference was not significant, χ2(1)=1.71, p=.19. 
Discussion 
 
 The Neutral scenario presented participants with a fairly average family with no notable 
issues and asked them to choose a custody arrangement for this family. Respondent judgments 
                                                          
5
Similarly to the previous footnote, analogous analyses were conducted for What Will Happen in the Grew Tired 
study. Again, the results were often significant (and even interacted with respondent’s Gender), but complex, and do 
not bear on the issues in this paper. In order to avoid distracting the reader, they are omitted. 
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for the Neutral scenario were nearly identical across the four versions (two conditions for each 
study, differing in the gender of the spouse who had the extramarital affair or chose to end the 
marriage), no matter the Test scenario that followed. Their predictions of how the case would 
actually be resolved were also consistent across the four versions. We are thus confident that the 
Neutral scenario provided a stable baseline against which to compare our respondents’ custody 
judgments in the Test cases.   
 The results in the Neutral scenario replicated our earlier findings in Braver, Ellman, 
Votruba, and Fabricius (2011): 77% of our respondents (it was 69% in the previous study) 
favored custodial arrangements calling for equal allocations of parenting time for a fairly average 
family with no notable issues. In contrast, only 29% (28% in the previous study) thought equal 
time would be ordered “in today’s courts and legal environment.” As in our earlier study, both 
male and female respondents thought courts would give mothers substantially more parenting 
time than they themselves would. Note that these data tell us only how our respondents believe 
the legal system would resolve this particular case. We have no data telling us whether their 
beliefs are correct or how judges would actually decide this same scenario.
6
 
Maternal preference rules were largely replaced in the 1970’s with rules directing courts 
to resolve custody disputes in a gender-neutral manner most consistent with the child’s best 
interest (Kay, 2002). Whatever courts may actually do, data in our Neutral case tells us that the 
                                                          
6
Nor does it seem that data currently exists that would accurately tell us. Doing so would require a comparison to the 
arrangements of real families who match the hypothetical Neutral family in every particular, including that they 
could not settle the custody arrangements themselves but required a judge’s decision that was described on (or 
transformed to) the 9-point scale we used. Only one study in the published literature (Fabricius & Hall, 2000) used 
that scale to describe the child’s post-divorce living arrangements, and it found the mean of its sample of over 800 
recent divorces was 3.12, whereas the mean of our respondents’ What they thought WILL Happen judgment was 
3.67.  However, the 3.12 figure aggregated over families of all descriptions and all manners of settling. Other data 
show that in 68-88% of cases, mothers end up being awarded primary physical custody; however, only 2 to 10% 
have those custody provisions decided by a judge (Stevenson, Braver, Ellman, & Votruba, 2012).  Future research 
could provide judges with the same scenarios we gave our participants and these results could be compared to the 
current results, although this research would lack the ecological validity of examining the judges’ actual custody 
allocations.  
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great majority of our respondents do not apply a maternal preference: when given facts that 
provide no basis for believing either parent superior on best interests grounds, they choose equal 
time.  Moreover, our prior work (Braver, Ellman, Votruba, & Fabricius, 2011) found that most 
respondents still preferred equal time when given facts, such as unequal division of prior care-
giving, or high levels of mutually instigated conflict,  that would move most courts and custody 
evaluators away from it. The results in the Test cases should be viewed against this background. 
 Study 1 presented our respondents with a Test case involving adultery.  As Kay (2002) 
noted, “prior to the early 1970s …custody of the children… turned to some degree on 
matrimonial fault” (p. 30), as did alimony and property distribution. But a clear intent of the no-
fault reformers was to make evidence of such behavior irrelevant “unless a contestant is able to 
prove that the parent's behavior in fact affects his relationship to the child (a standard which 
could seldom be met if the parent's behavior has been circumspect or unknown to the child)" 
(Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, §402, Comment, p. 45-46). Thus while there once was a 
time when courts might assume a parent who committed adultery was unsuited to have primary 
custody of the children, such a per se rule is not the law today. The parent’s sexual conduct is 
relevant today only insofar as it affects the child’s interest. As the American Law Institute 
formulates the test, a court deciding a custody contest “should not consider” a parent’s 
“extramarital sexual conduct…except upon a showing that it causes harm to the child” 
(American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (2000), at § 2.12(1)(e)). 
Courts have historically assumed such harm for some bad conduct, such as criminal violence, 
without requiring proof of the proposition, and they once made such assumptions for adultery 
also.  But not today. In sum, the law can consider extramarital affairs if they tell one something 
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about the custody arrangement most likely to serve the child’s interest, but not just to punish the 
adulterous parent. 
 The average judgment of respondents in the adultery Test case was nonetheless 
significantly different than the average judgment of respondents deciding the Neutral case. Our 
respondents allocated adulterous mothers .65 units less parenting time then they gave mothers in 
the Neutral case, and adulterous fathers .49 less than fathers in the Neutral case. (Recall that the 
difference between the penalty imposed on mothers and fathers—.65 vs .49—was not 
significant.)  But these are average results. Because the study used a repeated measures method, 
we could examine how individual respondents changed their judgment from the Neutral to the 
Test case. The father’s affair had no effect on the judgment made by 51% of our respondents, 
and the mother’s affair had no effect on the choice made by 41%.7  Among the nearly half who 
did shift their view on account of the affair, many shifted their time allocation only one unit on 
the nine point scale, from “live equal amounts of time with each parent” to “live with mother 
[father], see father [mother] a lot.” So many of those who shifted their time allocations still gave 
“a lot” of time to the adulterous parent.  More than 20% shifted their judgment two or more units 
away from the adulterous spouse, a larger move on the nine point scale and thus a greater 
departure, it might seem, from what current law requires.  
 Of course, we did not tell them what the law was, nor did we ask them to give us a 
judgment that complied with it. To the contrary, we said that there “was nothing in the law itself 
that gives strong guidance; every case needs to be decided on its own merits” and asked them to 
tell us what they would do if they were the judge, “based on what is best for the child.”  A 2006 
Pew survey found that 88 percent of Americans believe adultery to be “morally wrong,” far more 
                                                          
7
Of the remaining 59%, 12% of these adulterous mothers were awarded more custodial time. 
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than the proportion that condemned any of the other behaviors Pew asked about (Pew, 2006).
8
 So 
one might assume that those who gave the adulterous parent less time did so because they believe 
it’s proper to punish that parent for their bad conduct, even if the law does not, and that more 
than 20% (those who shifted their judgment two or more points) disagree with current law quite 
strongly. 
Nonetheless, we did not ask those who shifted their custody decision to explain why they 
did, and we cannot conclude from Study 1 alone that their purpose was to punish the adulterous 
spouse for immoral behavior. There are other possible motivations, and the results of Study 2 
suggest they need be considered. There was no adultery in the Test case for Study 2. Instead, one 
parent asked for a divorce that the other “didn’t want.” The parent seeking the divorce offered no 
specific complaints about the other parent, but “simply grew tired of the marriage” and the other 
spouse’s suggestion to try marriage counseling "did not help or change the [initiator’s] mind 
about giving up on the marriage". The Study 2 Test case thus describes no marital misconduct by 
either spouse that would make them “at fault” under the now-extinct fault divorce laws and, it 
might thus seem, no immoral conduct to punish. Yet our Study 2 respondents were almost as 
likely to subtract parenting time from the parent who just “lost interest” in the marriage as the 
Study 1 respondents were to reduce parenting time for the adulterer. The average reduction in 
parenting time for both was about half a unit. A bit less than half the respondents reduced the 
parenting time of the father who lost interest, virtually the same as for the father who had an 
affair. A third reduced the parenting time of the mother who lost interest, a bit less than the 47% 
who reduced it for the mother’s adultery.  But that difference was not significant.9 
                                                          
8
Only 35% thought sex between unmarried adults was morally wrong, while 50% thought abortion was.  
9Another way of judging that the patterns were “almost identical” is based on the patterns of means in Table 1 and 2, 
as well as the values of F for comparisons a) through d). But the two sets of results may also be tested more 
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We believe this finding rules out what might have at first seemed the most obvious 
explanation for the choices made by our Study 1 respondents: that they reduced the adulterer’s 
parenting time to punish him or her for the immoral behavior. To conclude otherwise seems to 
require the assumption that many of our respondents believe spouses who seek divorce because 
they find their marriage unsatisfying commit a moral wrong equivalent to adultery. We know of 
no data to suggest that equivalence and we think it unlikely.  
So what then is the explanation for our respondents’ judgments? The similarity in the 
results for Studies 1 and 2 oblige us to examine the two scenarios for common features that could 
explain why half our respondents adjust their parenting time allocation for both of them. That 
approach is more parsimonious than assuming that the motivation for reducing parenting time in 
Study 1 was a desire to punish adultery they believe immoral, while the motivation for the very 
similar reductions in Study 2, for the “grew tired” spouse, was (necessarily) something entirely 
different. We suggest three possible explanations for our respondents’ choices that could apply to 
both scenarios: (1) that the respondents who reduced parenting time in either Test case believed 
that the behavior of both the adulterous parent and the grew-tired parent demonstrated they were 
somehow not as good a parent; (2) that these respondents believed a parent who causes the 
marriage to end, without good reason, should be penalized for having imposed the burdens of 
parental separation on their child; or (3) that the “wronged” parent garners sympathy from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
formally. Since the data for both the “Affair” “study” and the “Growing Tired” “study” were collected at the same 
jury session, which “study” respondents happened to be assigned to is random. So it is just as correct to consider 
them 2 “levels” of a single study. This implies a 2 X 2 design on the between subjects factors: Who “Offended” 
(mom or dad) X “Offense Type” (Affair vs Lost Interest). To assess whether the results differed by Offense Type, 
we examined whether the Casetype X Who Offended 2 factor interaction (recall that, for Affair, the interaction was 
F(1,65)= 17.53, p< .01, and for Growing Tired, F(1,69)= 37.25, p< .01) was qualified by a triple interaction when 
we included Offense Type as an additional factor. In fact, the triple interaction of Casetype X Who Offended X 
Offense Type was NS with an F<1.  When conducted again, this time only on the “What I’d do” judgments 
(excluding the What will happen judgments), NS results with F<1 were again obtained. 
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respondents who consequently award more parenting time to that parent. We discuss each 
possibility in turn. 
 Could our respondents have believed the affair demonstrated that the adulterous or 
“grown-tired” parent was not as good a parent as the partner?  Our scenarios were intentionally 
constructed to make that belief unlikely, precisely because we could not learn if our respondents 
would punish a parent for morally objectionable behavior if we used facts that confounded the 
variables by suggesting the morally suspect parent was also a poor parent. Thus, the Neutral and 
Test scenarios all said that “There is nothing suggesting that either one lacks “fitness” as a 
parent”, that “[a]dditional evidence shows that both…parents…deeply love the two kids and 
are…reasonably good parents who are involved in their children’s lives,” and that they had both 
conducted themselves well since their separation, avoiding conflict, or arguments in front of the 
children, or bad-mouthing the other parent to the children. “They are both trying to make the best 
of the current situation.”   
But despite our efforts, we cannot rule out the possibility that some of those who 
penalized the offending parent in either test case believed the behavior in question cast doubt on 
their capacity as a parent.  To see why, consider first the Test case in Study 1 involving a year-
long adulterous affair. People may well think there’s considerable risk that a year-long affair will 
eventually ruin a marriage, no matter what the adulterer does to conceal the affair from the other 
parent and their children. And they might believe that parents who engage in extended affairs 
know, or should know, that risk.  Putting one’s children at a high risk of parental divorce to 
pursue an affair might seem evidence that the adulterer is inclined toward self-indulgence at the 
children’s expense. Respondents who had this view might well have doubted that the adulterous 
spouse was really the other spouse’s equal as a parent, even though the scenario facts included 
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generally positive statements about “both parents” that did not distinguish between them.  We 
believe it quite possible that such doubts about the adulterer’s parenting could explain why half 
our respondents gave the adulterous parent less time. 
Analogous observations may be made about the spouse who decides to end the marriage 
because he or she had “grown tired” of it. Some of our respondents might believe “growing tired 
of” the marriage is far too weak a justification for subjecting one’s children to divorce, and think 
the parent who proceeds on that basis is too quick to place his or her own comfort ahead of the 
children’s interests.  While probably few would favor penalizing in any way a childless spouse 
who sought to end a marriage she or he no longer liked, there’s some evidence that a fair number 
believe married parents should try hard to “stick it out” and stay together for the children’s 
benefit.
10
 Respondents who penalized the spouse who grew tired of the marriage in the second 
Test case might have this view, and might therefore doubt the adequacy of this parent’s 
commitment to the children. This explanation for the parenting time shift in both test cases, the 
adulterous parent and the grown-tired parent, would not, in principle, violate BIS rules against 
employing the custody decision to punish a parent’s misconduct, because the shift reflects 
instead a judgment about parenting capacity.  (In an actual case, of course, the trial court might 
need to buttress such decisions with some additional facts to show that its conclusions about 
relative parenting ability were based on more than surmise.)  
The second possible explanation we offer for our respondents’ judgments in both Test 
cases may be closer to incompatibility with the BIS. The BIS is by its terms future focused: the 
question is the custodial arrangement that is best for the child going forward. What happened in 
                                                          
10
A poll reported http://marriage.about.com/od/parenting/qt/staytogether.htm  found that, in response to the question 
“Should a couple stay together for the sake of the kids?” roughly a third each answered “yes”, “no” and “not sure.” 
Some commentators (e.g., Scott, 2000) even argue the law should erect additional barriers to divorce when a couple 
has minor children. 
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the past is relevant only insofar as it helps predict that future. The first explanation that we have 
just outlined is faithful to this principle. The second is not, but the distinction is subtle.  
We told our respondents in Study 1 that the affair had “ruined the marriage.” The 
adulterer was therefore responsible for the divorce, and thus also for the burden it places on the 
children. We told our respondents in Study 2 that the divorce will take place despite one spouse’s 
desire to continue the marriage, because the other spouse grew tired of it.  The spouse who grew 
tired of the marriage was therefore responsible for the divorce and the burden it places on the 
children. Thus our respondents might reasonably think both offending spouses were responsible 
for making their children worse off than they would have been had the marriage not been 
disrupted.  But that does not necessarily mean they think the offending parents in either case 
would not be as good as their respective spouses in the future, after the separation. An adulterer 
now free to remarry, or a former spouse now free of an unhappy marriage, may have fewer 
stresses or demands competing with his commitment to his child, and might be a better parent 
than before the divorce. That is one reason why the scenario description of both parents as loving 
and caring may be entirely plausible in both test cases. But it’s also possible that respondents 
who believe this also believe the children are worse off than if the offending spouse had not 
destroyed the marriage by committing adultery, or by seeking divorce for no compelling reason. 
In that case they might reduce both offenders’ parenting time to penalize them for this harm they 
imposed on their children. We cannot know, but nothing in our data allows us to rule out this 
alternative to the first explanation. 
A third possible explanation is that the participants develop sympathy for the “wronged” 
parent and award that parent more custody.  In Study 1 the wronged parent had their marriage 
ruined because of the other parent’s year-long affair.  In Study 2, the wronged parent had their 
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marriage fall apart even though they wanted it to stay together because the other parent simply 
grew tired of the marriage.  In both of these situations it is easy to imagine that the wronged 
parents are viewed as victims by the respondents and would garner sympathy because of the 
harm they have suffered.  Perhaps, then, some respondents compensated the wronged parent by 
awarding more custody time out of sympathy.  Like the other two explanations, our studies 
cannot rule this out as a possible underlying driver of the differences we observed in the test 
scenarios compared to the neutral case. 
Whatever the explanation for their judgment, about half the respondents were willing to 
depart from the outcome endorsed in the Neutral case, in response to the facts of our two Test 
cases, although many who departed from equal time did not depart very much. Custody 
decisions, of course, are made by judges, not juries of laymen. One might expect judges to 
adhere more reliably than lay respondents to a legal rule if there is no good evidence that doing 
so would protect the child’s interests. And of course, in an actual case the facts would be 
developed more fully, allowing the judge to rule out, or confirm, any of the three suppositions 
about the parents we suggest might have motivated our respondents’ choices. 
As with most experimental research, the generalizability of our findings is at issue. 
Experimental manipulations using vignettes allow researcher to isolate the influence of a single 
variable while holding all other information constant. Although this has the benefit of allowing 
the researcher to make firm inferences that would otherwise be obscure in non-experimental 
designs, vignette studies lack the richness of information and level of variability that is present in 
actual custody cases. Actual custody cases are rarely as simple as those used in our study. Thus, 
although we can draw conclusions about the influence of an extramarital affair or one spouse 
growing tired of the marriage on the custody decisions of our respondents, it is difficult to know 
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if respondents’ judgments would generalize to more detailed actual cases. Likewise, the 
generalizability of this research is also limited based on the specific wording we used in the 
scenarios, and other variations may produce different results. For example, we used the phrase 
“grew tired of the marriage” which may carry a specific connotation that impacted respondents’ 
decisions. It is possible that using a different phrase such as “felt the marriage was empty” could 
change the outcome of the study. In addition, the findings might differ if aspects of the families' 
description we held constant (e.g., "most of the marriage was without unusual conflict and the 
family life was quite average…the two children both appear to be normally adjusted, doing 
neither particularly well nor particularly poorly in school and otherwise") were altered.  Future 
research could continue to look at other variations of wording and factors to examine their 
influence on custody decisions.   
Another limitation to the generalizability of this study is that it was completed in only 
one location within the United States, Arizona. Throughout the United States, norms and values 
can vary on a number of dimensions. For example, states vary in the degree to which they are 
politically and socially conservative. Without doing additional studies like these in other states 
we cannot definitively say that our results generalize throughout the United States. We note, 
however, that additional analyses (not shown) suggest the findings we presented above did not 
differ beyond chance by the demographic variables we assessed, such as race, gender, education 
or income level, or by political ideology, providing some degree of reassurance about 
generalizability.  
There are a number of important policy implications we can draw from our findings. 
First, our respondents’ decisions in the neutral and test cases reflect the continuing cultural shift 
toward gender equality that was influential in the movement away from a maternal preference 
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and toward the adoption of the BIS. Overwhelmingly our respondents in these studies and those 
in Braver, Ellman, Votruba, & Fabricius (2011) favored equally shared parenting time; but it is 
important to note that in all of our scenarios we told our respondents that both parents were 
“reasonably good parents.” These findings suggest that there is a clearly emerging cultural value 
that when both parents are competent, children should spend about equal time with both parents 
after a divorce. To the degree that one thinks there is benefit in our policy regarding child 
custody to continue to be synchronized with the cultural norms of parenting, then these policies 
should encourage equal parenting time for each parent. In line with this idea, a consensus report 
was recently released endorsed by 110 experts which “supports the view that shared parenting 
should be the norm for parenting plans for children of all ages, including very young children 
(Warshak, 2014, p. 59).” In fact, some policy initiatives have already begun moving in the 
direction of a presumption of shared parenting time as being in the best interest of the child. For 
example, Arizona recently adopted new legislation that directs courts to “maximize parenting 
time between the two parents” unless there is evidence suggesting this would be against the 
child’s bester interests (Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 25, Section 403).  Another law when into 
effect in Arkansas in August, 2013 that states “joint custody” (defined as "the approximate and 
reasonable equal division of time with the child by both parents individually") …"is favored" (§ 
9-13-101). 
In addition, we have offered three possible explanations for the modest reduction in 
parenting time that half our respondents favored in both test cases: they believed the offending 
spouses would be worse parents than their respective partners, they believed the offending 
spouses should be penalized for the harm they caused their children by bringing about the 
divorce, or they are sympathetic toward the “wronged” parent and award them additional 
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custodial time in compensation.  Further research is required to choose between these 
explanations. We do believe, however, that our data cast doubt on a fourth possible explanation 
that many might have a priori thought the most likely—that our respondents in Study 1 reduced 
parenting time for the adulterous spouse in order to punish that adultery because they believe it 
immoral. That explanation seems unlikely to be correct.  
Indeed, the reluctance of our respondents to punish the adulterous spouse in the custody 
adjudication seems one of our most noteworthy results, especially if, as seems likely, most would 
also say they find adultery morally objectionable. Half would make no adjustment at all and most 
of the rest would make only a relatively small adjustment that is no greater than our respondents 
would make for the spouse who simply wants to end the marriage. This disinclination of our 
respondents to use the custody law to vindicate their moral beliefs could have its source in their 
focus on the children’s interests, a possibility that seems consistent with the guesses we offer to 
explain the modest parenting time adjustments that some respondents make. That conclusion, if 
correct, suggests that our respondents are considerably more sophisticated and thoughtful in their 
judgments that many might predict, and that the law’s current bar on considering fault in custody 
adjudications is quite compatible with current social mores.   
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  32 
 
References 
Amato, P. R. (2005). The impact of family formation change on the cognitive, social, and 
emotional well-being of the next generation. Future of Children, 15(2), 75-96.  
Amato, P. R. & Booth, A. (1997). A genderation at risk: Growing up in an era of family 
upheaval. First Harvard University Press. 
American Law Institute (2002). § 2.08 Allocation of custodial responsibility. Principles of the 
 Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations. 
Bhrolchain, M. N. (2001). “Divorce effects” and causality in the social sciences. European 
Sociological Review, 33, 44-53. 
Bhrolchain, M. N., Chappell, R., Diamond, I., & Jameson, C. (2000). Parental divorce and 
outcomes for children: Evidence and interpretation. European Sociological Review, 16, 
67-91. 
Bradford, L. (1996). Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-Fault 
Divorce Laws, The. Stan. L. Rev., 49, 607. 
Braver, S. L. (2007, September). Public opinion about fathers, mothers, and divorce: An 
 appearance of gender bias? Colloquium at University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona. 
Braver, S.L. & Ellman, I. M. (2013). Citizens’ views about fault in property division. Family 
Law Quarterly, 47, 419-435. 
Braver, S. L., Ellman, I. M., Votruba, A. M., & Fabricius, W. V. (2011). Lay judgments about 
child custody after divorce. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 17 (2), 212-240. 
Braver, S.L. & Lamb, M.E. (2012). Marital dissolution. In G. W. Peterson & K.R.Bush 
(Eds.), Handbook of Marriage and the Family (3rd ed. Pp 487-516).New York: Springer 
Publishing Company. 
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  33 
 
Brinig, M. F., & Buckley, F. H. (1998). No-fault laws and at-fault people. International Review 
of Law and Economics, 18(3), 325-340. 
Buchanan, C. M. (2001). Divorce. In J. V. Lerner, R. M. Lerner, & J. Finkelstein (Eds.) 
Adolescence in America: An encyclopedia (pp. 232–235). ABC-CLIO. 
Buckholtz, J. W., Asplund, C. L., Dux, P. E., Zald, D. H., Gore, J. C., Jones, O. D., & Marois, R. 
(2008). The neural correlates of third-party punishment. Neuron, 60(5), 930-940. 
Chambers, D. L. (1984). Rethinking the substantive rules for custody disputes in divorce. 
Michigan Law Review, 83, 477-569.  
Chase-Lansdale, P. L., Cherlin, A. J., & Kiernan, K. E. (1995). The long-term effects of parental 
divorce on the mental health of young adults: a developmental perspective. Child 
development, 66(6), 1614-1634  
Cherlin, A. (2010). Demographic Trends in the United States: A Review of Research in the 
2000s, Journal of Marriage and the Family 72, 403-419.  
doi:10.1111/j.17413737.2010.00710.x 
Cherlin, A. J., Furstenberg Jr, F. F., Chase-Lansdale, L., Kiernan, K. E., Robins, P. K., Morrison, 
D. R., & Teitler, J. O. (1991). Longitudinal studies of effects of divorce on children 
in great britain and the united states. Science, 252(5011), 1386-1389. 
Cushman, F., & Greene, J. D. (2012). Finding faults: How moral dilemmas illuminate cognitive 
structure. Social neuroscience, 7(3), 269-279. 
Ellman, I. M. (1996). The place of fault in modern divorce law. Arizona State Law Journal, 28 
(3), 773-838. 
Ellman, I. M., Braver, S., & MacCoun, R. J. (2008). Intuitive lawmaking: the example of  child 
support. Journal of Empirical Legal Study, 6, 69-109. 
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  34 
 
Ellman, I.M., Kurtz, P.M., Weithorn, L.A., Bix, B.H., Czapanskiy, K., & Eichner, M. (2010), 
 Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems (5
th
 edition). New Providence, N.J. & San Francisco, 
 CA:LexisNexis. 
Ellman, I. M., & Lohr, S. (1998). Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad 
Arguments for Fault Divorce. University of Illinois Law Review, 1997 (3), 719-772. 
Emery, R. E. (1999). Marriage, divorce, and children’s adjustment (2d ed.). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Emery, R. E. (1999). Postdivorce family life for children: An overview of research and some 
implications for policy. In R. A. Thompson & P. R. Amato (Eds.), The postdivorce 
family: Children, parenting,  and society (pp. 3-27). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, Inc. 
Fabricius, W. V. & Hall, J. (2000). Young adults’ perspective on divorce: living arrangements. 
 Family and Conciliation Courts Review, 38(4), 446-461.  
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415(6868), 137-140. 
Friendman, L. (1985). A History of American Law. New York, Simon & Schuster.  
Furstenberg Jr, F. F. & Cherlin, A.(1994). Divided families: What happens to children when 
parents part. Harvard University Press. 
Glendon, M. A. (1981). The New Family and the New Property. Toronto, Butterworths. 
Grossberg, M. (1985). Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century 
America. North Carolina, The University of North Carolina Press. 
Haidt, J. (2013). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. 
Random House Digital, Inc.. 
Hartog, H. (2000). Man and Wife in America: A History. Harvard College. 
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  35 
 
Hetherington, M.E. & Kelly, J. B. (2002). For better or for worse: Divorce reconsidered. New 
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 
Kay, H. H. (2002). No-fault divorce and child custody: Chilling out the gender wars. Family Law 
Quarterly, 36 (1), 27-47. 
Kelly, J. B. (1994). The determination of child custody.  The future of children, 4, 121-142.  
Keppel, G. (1973). Design and analysis: A researcher’s handbook. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Korobkin, R.B. (2002). Empirical scholarship in contract law: Possibilities and 
pitfalls. University of Illinois Law Review, 1033-1065. 
Lamb, M. E. (2012). Mothers, fathers, families, and circumstances. Applied developmental 
science, 16(2), 98-111. 
Maccoby, E. E. (1999). The custody of children of divorcing families: weighing the alternatives. 
In R. A. Thompson & P. R. Amato (Eds.), The postdivorce family: Children, parenting, 
and society (pp. 51-70). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Mnookin R. H. & Kornhauser, L. (1979). Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, Yale Law Journal, 88, 950—997. 
Mason, M. A. (1994). From father’s property to children’s rights: The history of child custody in 
the United States. New York: Columbia University Press.  
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1970). Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act (UMDA). 
O'Connell, M. E. (1988). Alimony after no-fault: A practice in search of a theory. New Eng. L. 
Rev., 23, 437. 
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  36 
 
Parkman, A. M. (2000). Good intentions gone awry: No-fault divorce and the American family. 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Pew Research: Social & Demographic Trends (2006). A Barometer of Modern Morals: Sex, 
Drugs, and the 1040. Retrieved from http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2006/03/28/a-
barometer-of-modern-morals/. 
Potter, D. (2010). Psychosocial well-being and the relationship between divorce and children's 
academic achievement. Journal of Marriage and Family, 72, 933-946. 
Roberts, J.V. & Stalans, L. J. (1997).  Public opinion, crime, and criminal justice.  Westview. 
Robinson, P. H. & Darley, J. M. (1995).  Justice, liability, and blame: Community views and the 
criminal law.  Westview. 
Roth, A. (1976). The tender years presumption in child custody disputes. Journal of Family Law, 
15, 423–462.  
Scott, E. S. (1992). Pluralism, parental preferences, and child custody. California Law Review, 
80, 615-672. 
Scott, E. S. (2000). Social norms and the legal regulation of marriage. Virginia law review, 86, 
1901-1970. 
Schneider, C. E. (1985). Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 
Michigan Law Review, 83, 1803-1950. 
Schneider, C. E. (1994). Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse. 
Utah L. Rev., 503. 
Stahl, P.M. (1999). Complex issues in child custody evaluations. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, Inc.  
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  37 
 
Stevenson, M., Braver, S., Votruba, A. M., & Ellman, I. M. Marriage, Divorce, Child Custody. 
Handbook of  Father Involvement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2
nd
 Edition) (2012). 
Editors Cabrera, N. J. & Tamis-LeMonda, C. S. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.  
Thomas, E. A. C., & Hogue, A. (1976). Apparent weight of evidence, decision criteria and 
confidence ratings in juror decision making. Psychological Review, 83, 442-465. 
Tyler, Tom R., & Boeckmann, Robert J. (1997) Three strikes and you’re out, but why? The 
psychology of public support for punishing rule breakers.  Law & Society Review, 31(2), 
237-266. 
Wardle, L. D. (1991). No-fault divorce and the divorce conundrum. Bigham Young University 
Law Review, 79. 
Warshak, R. A. (2007). Punching the parenting time clock: the approximation rule, social 
science, and the baseball bat kids. Family Court Review, 45(4), 600-619. 
Warshak, R. A. (2011). Parenting by the Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-Child Standard, judicial 
discretion, and the American Law Institute’s “Approximation Rule”. University of 
Baltimore Law Review, 41, 83-164. 
Warshak, R. A. (2014). Social Science and Parenting Plans for Young Children: A Consensus 
Report. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 20 (1), 46-67. 
Wilson, E. O. (2012). The social conquest of earth. WW Norton & Company. 
Wissler, R.L. Evans, D.L., Hart, A.J., Morry, M.M. & Saks, M.J. (1997). Explaining “Pain and 
Suffering” awards: The role of injury characteristics and fault attributions. Law and 
Human Behavior, 21(2), 181-207. 
 
  
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  38 
 
Author Note 
  Ashley Votruba, Department of Psychology and Sandra Day O’Connor College of 
Law, Arizona State University; Sanford L. Braver Professor Emeritus of Psychology, Arizona 
State University, and Research Psychologist, University of California, Riverside; Ira M. Ellman, 
Charles J. Merriam Distinguished Professor of Law and Affiliate Professor of Psychology, 
Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law; and William V. Fabricius, 
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University. 
 The authors express their appreciation to the Judges of the Pima County Superior Court, 
and especially to the Jury Commissioner at the time we ran our studies, Kathy Brauer, for 
making it possible for them to conduct this study.  We also wish to thank George Knight for his 
reading of an earlier draft. 
These studies were conducted as part of Ashley Votruba’s Honors Thesis in Psychology, 
under the direction of Sanford Braver, as well as the remaining authors.  
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ashley M. Votruba, 
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, P.O. Box 871104, Tempe, AZ 85287-
1104. E-mail: Ashley.votruba@asu.edu. 
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  39 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Min/No
Dad
Some Dad Moder.
Dad
Lot Dad Equal Lot Mom Moder.
Mom
Some
Mom
Min/No
Mom
P
er
ce
n
t 
o
f 
R
es
p
o
n
d
en
ts
 
Parenting Time 
Figure 1. Parent Time Awards Respondents Would Make in Neutral 
Case 
If I Were Judge
What Will Happen
Live with Mom Live with Dad 
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
None Some Mod Amt A Lot Equal A Lot Mod Amt Some None
P
er
ce
n
t 
o
f 
P
R
es
p
o
n
ce
s 
How Much Time Spent with Other Parent 
Figure 2. Parenting Time Awards Respondents Would Make in 
Extramarrital Affair Case 
Live with Adulterer 
Live with Innocent 
FAULT, PARENTING, AND CUSTODY                                                                                                  41 
 
If I Were Judge
Neutral Test
Mother Affair 4.76 5.41
Father Affair 4.85 4.36
Table 1. Means for If I Were Judge for 
Extramarital Affairs, by CaseType, and Whose 
Affair, with arrows indicating significant 
differences
Note: The higher the mean value, more parenting 
time for Father is being awarded. 5=equal time
b
c
d
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If I Were Judge
Neutral Test
Mother Grew Tired 4.69 5.19
Father Grew Tired 4.71 4.26
Table 2. Means for If I Were Judge for Who 
Grew Tired Study, by CaseType, and Who 
Grew Tired, with arrows indicating significant 
differences
Note: The higher the mean value, more 
parenting time for Father is being awarded. 
5=equal time
b
c
d
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
